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Miranda: Ignoring an Attempted Invocation
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Rule: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda (i.e., ignoring an invocation), so long as not “coerced,” are admissible for purposes of impeachment.
Facts: Defendant, a parolee, left San Bernardino for Garden Grove despite his parole agent’s denial of
permission to leave the area. In Garden Grove, Hong Thi Nguyen’s bruised and battered body, bleeding
from a head wound and nude from the waist down, was found discarded along with the trash at the rear
of a Thrifty Drug Store. She died on the way to the hospital. A later autopsy showed that although she died from a gunshot to the head, she had also been beaten, strangled and raped. Her purse and Toyota MR2 were missing. Two days later, defendant was seen in Springfield, Missouri, driving Nguyen’s
Toyota MR2. Defendant subsequently got into a shootout with the Springfield police, wounding one officer and was arrested. A couple of weeks later, defendant, charged only with his Missouri offenses, was visited in jail by two Garden Grove detectives. As soon as he was told that they were from California and that they needed to advise him of his Miranda rights, defendant blurted out that he had been advised by both his mother and a California attorney (apparently hired by his mother not to talk to the police. Acknowledging that defendant had just invoked his Miranda rights, the detectives prepared to
terminate the interview. But on the way out, one of the detectives commented: “Well, you understand that this can’t be used in the case-in-chief against you.” The detective later admitted in testimony that although not part of any pre-planned tactic, his intent in making this comment was to get defendant talking in the hopes of obtaining some incriminating statements that the prosecution might be able to use for impeachment purposes. No one ever discussed with defendant the intricacies of this legal concept or the differences between the People’s “case-in-chef” and impeachment during rebuttal. The tactic worked, leading to defendant making some incriminating statements that directly connected him to Nguyen’s murder. Charged with capital murder, defendant sought to suppress his statements to the Garden Grove detectives, arguing that the statements should not be allowed into evidence for any purpose. The trial court denied his motion. With the specter of being impeached by his statements
to the detectives, defendant did not testify at trial. Convicted of all charges and sentenced to death, defendant’s appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic. Among the issues on appeal was whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse to suppress his statements.
Held: The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. Defendant’s primary argument on appeal was that the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Dickerson v. United States (530 U.S. 428), reaffirming the rule of Miranda, had the effect of reversing the long standing rule that uncoerced statements , obtained in violation of Miranda, were admissible for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who testifies and lies. (See Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S.222: People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184), even though those same statements are otherwise inadmissible in the People’s case-in-chief. To this the Court simply noted: “Nothing in Dickerson indicated that the court’s careful balancing of the parameters of the Miranda rule had changed.” The Court did note, however, that telling the Defendant after his invocation that his statements could not be used in the People’s “case-in-chief” without further explaining the converse principle: i.e., that those same statements might be used
for purposes of impeachment, was as issue that could not be ignored. However, under the facts of this case, with a man who held his own during the interrogation, “there (was) no evidence that defendant, a convicted felon, did not understand (the detective’s) point, or that detectives otherwise mischaracterized the interview as wholly “off the record.” The Court further found that nothing in the detectives’ tactic, even their failure to explain to him about the potential use of his statements for purposes of impeachment, amounted to coercion. Under the circumstances of this case, where the unrestrained defendant was comfortable, the interrogation was brief (45 minutes), there was neither threats nor harsh questioning, and absolutely nothing was done by the detectives that might have “overborne” his “free will”,…neither the failure to read defendant his Miranda rights, nor the continued interrogation after he asserted such rights, compels a finding of official coercion.” Allowing defendant’s statements to be available for use by the prosecution for impeachment purposes was not error.
Note: The Court, at least in this decision, made no mention of the propriety of ignoring a defendant’s invocation and questioning him anyway, purposely attempting to obtain impeachment evidence. This glaring omission is surprising, given ravings by the Court in prior cases discussing the inadvisability of such an interrogation tactic. For instance, it wasn’t too long ago that a very angry Supreme Court expended a significant amount of ink severely chastising several detectives for doing just that. (See People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774) Specifically, the court in Jablonski referred to such an intentional Miranda violation as “unethical,” and a tactic that is “strongly disapproved.” (Id., at p. 817.) Given the usual negative reaction by both the California Supreme Court (See also People v. Neal (2003)31 Cal. 4th 63.) and the United States Supreme Court (e.g., Missouri v. Seibert (2004)542 U.S. 600, at fn 2.) to police officers purposely ignoring suspects’ attempted Miranda invocations, there are those of us who strongly believe that police officers and prosecutors, being bound by both the United States and California Supreme Courts’ firm dictates not to engage in such misconduct, should not be doing this. The failure of the Court in this case to discuss the issue does not alter this conclusion.
